When news does its job, attentive citizens are better able to understand both the challenges facing the country and the competing visions of those seeking to lead it. Indeed, some argue that "the purpose of journalism is to provide people with the information they need to be free and self-governing." 1 In years past, those studying media have reliably found that consumers of traditional news were better informed about issues of national concern. 2 However, the growth of a new media culture in which partisans are able to envelop themselves in like-minded content raises a question: in the world of ideologically tinged cable news, opinion-talk radio, and viral email, does news in any of its various incarnations still sift fact from fabrication and, in the process, heighten a voter's knowledge about those aspiring to lead?
Our study of the presidential general election campaign of 2008 suggests that traditional news sources are not the custodians of fact that they once were. At the same time, sources that blend discussion of news with what we call opiniontalk are at least occasional purveyors of unbalanced issue coverage and misinformation. In this transformed media environment, presidential debates hold up as one of the only venues, if not the sole source, that heightens citizens' campaign knowledge. These conclusions arise from our study of how newspapers, national and local broadcast and cable news, Internet, talk radio, and debate audiences responded to questions about the central deceptions advanced by the major party candidates.
In the general presidential election of 2008, viewers in battleground states were assaulted by deceptive claims, among them that Arizona Senator and Republican Party nominee John McCain wanted to cut Social Security and stay in Iraq for one hundred years and that Illinois Senator and Democratic Party nominee Barack Obama did not take Iran seriously and had a close relationship with former Weather Underground leader William Ayers. 3 The two most prevalent distortions, each backed by multimillion dollar ad buys, involved taxation. Speci½cally, the Democrats alleged that McCain would impose a net tax on health care bene½ts, and the Republicans insisted that Obama would raise taxes on working families including "yours." Where the Obama campaign spent $43 million on broadcast ads asserting the ½rst claim, the McCain campaign devoted $53 million to spots alleging the second. 4 The Democratic nominee's rhetoric failed the truth test by suggesting that the Republican would tax employer-provided health bene½ts, a statement that sins by omission because the tax would have been offset with a credit of $2,500 per individual or $5,000 per family. "It could all unravel," said one of the Obama ads. "Your health care under John McCain. McCain would tax health bene½ts for the ½rst time ever, meaning higher income taxes for millions." On the other side, McCain traf½cked in the false conclusion that Obama planned on raising middle-class taxes. "Times are tough. Obama voted to raise taxes on people making just $42,000," noted one McCain ad. "He promises more taxes on small businesses, seniors, your life savings, your family." Obama had forecast raising taxes, but only on those households making over $250,000. 5 Each side rebutted the false charges: Obama in counter-advertising, debates, and speeches; McCain in the latter two. In a moment, we will argue that McCain's decision not to rebut using advertising was consequential.
An Annenberg Public Policy Center post-election survey found widespread public ignorance about the facts underlying the nominees' exchanges on taxes. 6 When respondents were asked which candidate(s) they thought would raise middle-class taxes, one in ½ve (22 percent) answered correctly that neither planned on doing so; four in ½ve (78 percent) either did not know the answer or answered incorrectly, including one in six (17 percent) who embraced the deception that Obama would raise taxes. When asked about McCain's health care plan, four in ten (42 percent) knew that his tax on health care bene½ts would be offset, while six in ten (58 percent) did not know the correct answer, including 15 percent of the sample that believed that bene½ts would be taxed without the offsetting credit. 7 The questions we address here are: how effectively did the candidates, news media, and debates blunt these central deceptions and increase audiences' knowledge? And did embracing either of the false beliefs affect the way people voted?
Our ½rst ½nding is straightforward.
Exposure to ads increased the impact of the deception, but only when it was not rebutted. By counter-advertising, Obama negated the effect of McCain's attack. When his campaign decided not to do the same, McCain left audiences vulnerable to the false inference invited by Obama's ads.
Because candidates most often reach voters with ads in slots surrounding local news, news-viewing is a rough indicator of ad exposure. Further, because local news focuses not on presidential campaigns but, rather, on crime, sports, and weather, 8 unless the other side rebuts an attack, higher local news consumption should predict embracing the rhetoric in the ads. Unsurprisingly then, we ½nd that the more that people relied on local news, the more they believed that McCain would tax health bene½ts without the offsetting credit, but the less likely they were to hold that Obama would raise middle-class taxes. 9 Speci½cally, those who watched local news every day were one-and-a-half times more prone to believe the deception about McCain than those who watched no local news, but were 1.7 times less likely to believe the deception about Obama.
When covering politics, broadcast and cable media tend to engage in tactical assessments and "he said/she said" reporting, failing in the process to cor-rect the deceptions offered by either or both sides. 10 Consistent with this supposition, broadcast and cable news more often than not restated the suspect allegations without challenging the misinformation they contained. This excerpt from nbc Nightly News is illustrative: From this segment's focus on tactics, audiences could learn that Obama was advantaged by his assault on McCain's plan. Because the Democratic nominee's allegation was presented without correction, the deception was reinforced. Still, as the following excerpt from cbs Evening News suggests, broadcast journalists occasionally debunked the fabricated claims:
Wyatt Andrews: John McCain wants a multitrillion-dollar tax on the middle class? Here are the facts. Obama has the tax part correct, but the impact on the middle class is exaggerated. Most people will see tax cuts. McCain does want to tax the health insurance bene½ts that 60 million Americans now buy through their employers tax free. However, McCain also proposes to give the money back as a tax credit, $2,500 for individuals, $5,000 for families. 12 Although we ½nd no evidence that watching broadcast network news increased the likelihood of embracing either deception, neither did we ½nd that those news viewers were more likely to know the candidates' position on either issue. In other words, we cannot say that network news did any harm, but it also did not do any good.
Because partisans seek reinforcement from like-minded media outlets, the rise of partisan media has increased the likelihood that those of one ideological bent will be protected from information that might challenge their presuppositions. The ideological dispositions of the audiences of cable news channels differ. Those calling themselves moderates and liberals are more likely to watch cnn, and those wearing the conservative label are more likely to tune to fox News. In our sample, liberals and moderates were two-and-a-half times more prone to watch cnn as their primary cable news channel, and conservatives were over three-and-a-half times more likely to watch fox News. Our survey contained too few msnbc viewers to permit reliable estimates for that network.
Research Neither the newest medium on the scene, the Internet, nor the oldest, the newspaper, enabled those who relied on them to make sense of either claim. Knowledge of the facts behind the fabrications wasn't increased by using the Internet for information about the presidential election or by reading major city or national newspapers. Importantly, however, neither medium increased audiences' embrace of the deceptions. Put simply, these two outlets also neither helped voters nor harmed them.
Our ½ndings up to this point are disappointing. The news media did not serve as effective custodians of fact in 2008; instead, some outlets performed a function one would expect of campaign surrogates. However, the citizen seeking political substance did have a recourse. For almost ½ve decades, studies have con½rmed the power of presidential debates to increase voter knowledge, 17 and 2008 was no exception.
The debates' two-sided clash of competing ideas, unmediated by interpretation from reporters, spiked voter knowledge. In these often disparaged encounters, the presidential and vice presidential nominees took on the deceptions perpetrated by the other side, including those on health care and taxing proposals. On no fewer than ten occasions across three debates, Barack Obama insisted either that he would not raise taxes on households making less than $250,000 a year or that 95 percent of Americans would get a tax cut. When McCain made the charge, Obama responded:
John McCain: Senator Obama's secret that you don't know is that his tax increases will increase taxes on 50 percent of small business revenue. . . . I've got some news, Senator Obama, the news is bad. So let's not raise anybody's taxes, my friends, and make it be very clear that I am not in favor of tax cuts for the wealthy. I am in favor of leaving the tax rates alone and reducing the tax burden of middle-income Americans. Only a few percent of small businesses make more than $250,000 a year. So the vast majority of small businesses would get a tax cut under my plan. 18 The debates afforded McCain the same opportunity. So, for example, the third debate included this exchange: As this Obama example illustrates, the candidates were occasionally more accurate in characterizing their opponents' plans in the debates than they were in ads. Still, the Arizona senator regularly suggested that the Democratic nominee would raise taxes, especially on small businesses while he supported "reducing the tax burden" of the middle class. At the same time, his Illinois counterpart repeatedly implied that McCain's health care plan would raise taxes on many.
However, because each side had the opportunity to correct the other's misstatements, watching the debates increased knowledge. In the presence of a robust list of controls, including political ideology, party identi½cation, political knowledge, and news consumption, those who tuned into all four debates were one-anda-half times less likely than non-viewers to believe the deception that Obama would raise middle-class taxes, and were one-and-a-half times more likely to know that neither candidate had proposed upping them on the middle-class. Those who watched all four debates were not only not more likely to believe Obama's deception about McCain, but were 3.8 times more likely than non-viewers to know that a credit would offset the tax.
All of this matters because, even in the presence of a robust list of controls, being misled about these issues affected vote choice. 20 Voters who were convinced that McCain would impose a net tax on health care bene½ts were 2.8 times more likely to cast their ballot for Obama. Similarly, those who believed that Obama would raise middle-class taxes were 7.8 times more likely to vote for McCain. To calibrate the importance of these ½ndings, note that embracing deception is almost as strong a predictor of vote as party identi½cation. 21 When they reinforced deceptions, news outlets had the same distorting effect on voting behavior.
In short, with the exception of Rush Limbaugh's correction of distortions of McCain's health care plan, other media we studied failed to increase citizens' understanding of the facts underlying the charges and counter-charges from the campaigns. In some cases, news exposure actually magni½ed belief in a deception: viewers of fox and listeners to Rush Limbaugh were more likely to endorse McCain's contortion of Obama's position. Candidate advertising was successful in correcting misstatements by the other side. However, the hero in our story is not a traditional news outlet, a partisan news source, or paid advertising. It was not reliance on any of these sources, but rather viewing presidential debates that increased voter knowledge and undercut the power of the deceptions from both sides.
Still, the new media environment carries with it an increased capacity to locate accurate campaign information. In 2008, the St. Petersburg Times added PolitiFact to a menu of existing sources dedicated to making politicians accountable for their assertions. Similarly, The Washington Post's Michael Dobbs regularly unmasked the deceptions in candidate ads. And FactCheck.org (run by the Annenberg Public Policy Center) continued to play the role it introduced in the 2004 election. 22 All three sites devoted space to challenging distortions in broadcast and cable advertising and suspect content in cyberspace. Of course, the disposition of news outlets to replicate the effort of these sites is dampened by a commercial environment in which onenewspaper towns are giving way to nonewspaper towns; surviving news outlets are laying off staff; and audiences for traditional news are scattering to a wide range of alternative sources. 23 Although we assume that exposure to sites debunking fabrication will increase knowledge, our survey contained too few respondents to test that hypothesis.
In his 1805 inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson expressed con½dence that "[t]he public judgment will correct false reasoning and opinions on a full hearing of all parties." 24 In 2008, news failed to help the public perform the role Jefferson envisioned for it, and citizens did not live up to the expectations Jefferson set for them either. Still, the debates served the public well.
As the audience for traditional news erodes, as cable and websites proliferate, and as audiences increasingly gravitate to sources that reinforce their beliefs, the concerns that Jefferson's statement invites raise at least three questions. To what sources can the public turn in order to gain a "full hearing of all parties"? How does a democracy motivate citizens to select such sources? And, ½nally, are there alternative ways in which "public judgment" can be adequately informed? 
